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From Cells to Souls-and Beyond: Changing Portraits of Human Nature, ed.
Malcolm Jeeves. Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing
Company, 2004. Pp. xiv, 252. $29.00 (paper); and A Materialist Metaphysics of the Human Person, by Hud Hudson. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 2001. Pp. xii, 202. $40.00.
STEWART GOETZ, Ursinus College

From Cells to Souls -and Beyond: Changing Portraits of Human Nature is a collection of engaging essays about the nature of a human being. The authors
of the essays are professionals in diverse disciplines, including anatomy
and structural biology, biblical studies, genetics, neurology, philosophy,
psychiatry, psychology, and systematic theology. Though the authors are
from diverse disciplines, they are all professing Christians who are united
by the belief that mind/soul-body substance dualism (dualism, for short)
is false and that the human person is best thought of as a single entity
(monism) with two kinds of properties, namely, mental/soulish and physical. Simply stated, "[t ]here is ... an irreducible duality ... , but it is not a
duality that rightly calls for dualism" (p. 237). The contributors preferred
way of explaining the existence of this duality of properties is in terms of
emergence. In virtue of the increasing capacity and interactive complexity of the lower level complex physical systems that comprise the human
biological entity, mental properties with their causal powers emerge at
a higher (highest) level. The result is the capacity for genuine top-down
causation from our mental lives to our physical lives (pp. 63-66).
Though the authors emphasize that their "nonreductive physicalism"
(p. 64) makes mental-to-physical causation possible, they are equally emphatic that what recommends their view of the human person over the
dualist's is the existence of intimate bottom-to-top causal links between
what goes on in different regions of our brains and our mental lives. For
example, the left of the two brain hemispheres is usually dominant for
speech so that "[l]eft-sided brain lesions can cause a searching for words, a
limitation of vocabulary, a shortening of sentences, or a jumble of meaningless words" (pp. 46-47). Early degeneration of neurons in the hippocampus of the brain (located in the right and left temporal lobes of the cerebral
cortex) results in disturbances in "working memory" where persons may
have increasing difficulty either remembering where they placed items,
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recalling the names of persons to whom they were recently introduced,
"or following the narratives of stories they are reading or watching on
television" (p. 87). Multiple sclerosis can produce fronto-temporal-limbi
damage in the brain which results in an overflow of sadness, mirth, or
despair (p. 45). With Alzheimer's disease, neurons die, small holes appear
throughout brain tissue, and the cerebral cortex looks shriveled in CT
scans of the brain. For Christians with Alzheimer's, the effect of the disease on their spiritual lives is typically devastating. A Presbyterian minister, Robert Davis, reported that his spiritual life was miserable. Because
his emotions were dead, he could not experience the comfort of his Savior
(p. 89). "[T]he nature of the [causal] interdependence increasingly uncovered by scientific research makes a substance dualism harder to maintain
without tortuous and convoluted reasoning" (p. 240).
Because the contributors are Christians and well aware that the Christian tradition has overwhelmingly sided with dualism, they are concerned
about whether their view accords wIth the view of the human person
found in Scripture. The consensus of the authors is that while Scripture
does not engage in philosophical anthropology as such ("[T]he Bible's witness to the nature of human life is ... na"ive ... because it has not worked
out in what we may regard as a philosophically satisfying way the nature of physical existence in life, death, and afterlife" (p. 194)), what can
be gleaned from it is more than hospitable to nonreducitve physicalism.
"[T]he Old Testament expresses little concern with the question, What
happens when we die?" (p. 188), and there is no suggestion that the dead
inhabit Sheol because "some essential part of the human being (whether a
soul or a spirit, or some other) has survived death" (p. 189). With the onset
of Second Temple Judaism (fourth century B.C.E.), a dizzying array of positions about the nature of the human being and the afterlife developed in
the mix of Greek, Roman, and Jewish thought (p. 190). Though dualism
was included in the mix, nothing Paul says in his letters entails that he
was a dualist. Indeed, "Paul affirms a profound continuity between life in
this world and life everlasting with God, a continuity whose form is bodily
existence" (p. 192; author's emphasis). Overall, the Bible gives witness to a
deeply relational view of a human being with others of his own kind, creation, and God (pp. 94-101, 166, 173, 194, 199-208, 238), and those today
who find dualism in Scripture "read a Cartesian interest in 'the mind' back
into the Bible" (p. 184).
Have the authors made their case for nonreductive physicalism? There
are three reasons to doubt that they have. First, while a dualist can and
should affirm the importance of relationships for being human, what is
at issue between nonreductive physicalists and dualists is not the importance of those relationships but the nature of what enters into them. Is a
soul one of the relata? Nothing that the authors of From Cells to Souls-and
Beyond argue requires a negative answer to this question. Indeed, none
of them ever mentions the fundamenltal reason why the dualist believes
this question requires an affirmative answer. This reason concerns the apparent substantial simplicity of the self I am aware of myself not having
any substantive parts, while I am aware of my physical body (brain) having substantive parts. Hence, I am ontologically distinct from my physical
body (brain).
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It is because the authors never bring up the issue of the self's substantial
simplicity that they never mention one of the most fascinating issues in
contemporary brain science, namely, the binding problem. As the authors
rightly emphasize, different mental/soul capacities and events (memory,
emotion, sensation, thought, etc.) are correlated with events that are localized in different areas of the brain. If we were to make inferences on
the basis of this information alone, we would conclude that one area of
the brain remembers, another experiences emotion, another hears, another sees, another philosophizes, and so on. This is not, however, what we
discover from the first-person point of view. From that point of view, I, a
simple, unified self, simultaneously now remember kissing my daughter this
morning, experience pleasure along with that memory, hear the rain hitting the window, see the computer screen, feel a throbbing in my right foot,
and the like. Given this datum, some neuroscientists consider the idea that
there is a single location in the brain where all of these soul occurrences are
bound together into a unified whole. Regardless of whether such a spot is
ever found in the brain, what is important to realize is that neuroscientists
would not even consider the idea that there might be a physical point in
the brain that mirrors our first-person experience of ourselves unless they
took seriously the nature of that experience. What the contributors to From
Cells to Souls-and Beyond do not tell the reader is that if nonreductive
physicalism is true, our first-person experiences of ourselves at any present moment as substantially simple, unified selves must be illusory.
In addition to the issue of the nature of our selves at the present moment,
there is the matter of our identity across or through time. The contributors
devote a good bit of space to elaborating how neuropathologies can disrupt one's experience of self-identity through time (pp. 78, 81-83, 85, 94).
For example, Alzheimer's dementia affects one's ability to remember recent
and past events. What they do not make clear is why we should conclude
from this that the subject whose capacity to remember is undermined by a
physical disorder such as Alzheimer's cannot be an enduring soul.
In light of the authors' failure to address the issue of the simplicity of
the self, it is important to note that they mischaracterize the justification
for holding the dualist position. The contributors repeatedly maintain that
the dualist claim that the soul exists is a postulate to account for human
experiences that cannot yet be accounted for neurologically or biologically
(pp. 180, 245). According to the contributors, dualism is a soul-of-the-gaps
hypothesis much like the god-of-the-gaps hypothesis that is put forth by
some religious believers (pp. 62, 145). Nothing, however, could be further
from the truth. The justification for the belief in dualism is footed first and
foremost in first-person experience. It is not found in the physical world
and observations of data from the third-person perspective for which dualism is believed to be the best explanatory hypothesis.
The second reason for doubting that the authors have made their case
for nonreductive physicalism concerns the relationship between the firstperson experience of the self as a simple soul and the anthropological
views of Scripture. While the authors correctly maintain that the Bible
does not develop a philosophical anthropology, their claim (pp. 166, 173,
183-184) that dualists have read a Cartesian interest back into the Bible
is mistaken. Dualists are simply reading Scripture as an ordinary person
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reads Scripture, and because both the ordinary first-person view of the
self is thoroughly dualist in character and Scripture is written for ordinary
people, it is only natural to assume that Scripture presupposes (and does
not argue for) the truth of dualism. In this context, it must be emphasized
that Descartes philosophized about dualism. He did not illvent it. Dualism
was around long before Descartes and even Plato (who also philosophized
about, but did not invent, dualism). Thus, the argument that dualism is a
Greek/Hellenistic idea (p. 190) is bogus. The early church fathers drew
upon Greek philosophizing about dualism when thinking about matters
such as the nature of the persons of Godhead, but neither they nor the
writers of Scripture needed to go to Athens to find dualism. The concept
of and belief in the soul was also present in such disparate places as India (e.g., Hinduism), China (e.g., Confucianism), and North America (e.g.,
native American religion). Because dualism arises out of ordinary, firstperson experience, the burden is on anyone who would argue that the
Bible does not assume dualism.
The third reason for doubting that the authors make their case for nonreductive physicalism concerns the issue of bottom-to-top or physical-tomental causation. While modern neuroscience has written a more detailed
story about what goes on in the brain when mentallsoulish events are causally produced, the augmented details in no way change the substantive
nature of the story. People have always known that a good knock on the
head or the ingestion of various natural substances could produce some
remarkable effects. What modern science has enabled us to do (through
drugs, electrical probes, etc.) is produce the same, and additional, remarkable effects while bypassing the knock on the head. Moreover, with the
aid of sophisticated observational tedmology (MRIs, PET and CAT scans,
etc.), scientists are now able to observe the disparate brain activities that
accompany seeing, hearing, dreaming, etc. Why, however, should discovery of the fact that the causal sources of various mentallsoulish effects are
localized in different areas of the brain, as opposed to the brain as a whole,
lead us to conclude that dualism is harder to believe than it was before?
Of course, it is part of the dualist view that the mental/soul-physical relation is not only one-way in nature. Mental events also produce physical
events, and the dualist concedes that this relationship is just as mysterious
as that which obtains when physical events produce mental/soul events.
Nonreductive physicalism, too, acknowledges what it regards as top-tobottom causation, and its proponents concede that their view provides no
greater insights than dualism about mental-to-physical causation. They
admit that "we are not claiming that we understand how this [mental-tophysical] interdependence works. Thus far we know of no evidence that
gives an adequate [nonreductive physicalist] explanation of how cognition produces changes in brain processes; rather, we can give merely a
description" (p. 244). Given that nonreductive physicalism, like dualism,
cannot provide an explanation of how the mental produces changes in the
brain, one is left puzzled about why dualism should be jettisoned in favor
or nonreductive physicalism.
In closing, I emphasize that From Cells to Souls-and Beyond is an extremely interesting and at times-e.g." when the authors describe the decline of the quality of life of Alzheimer's patients-emotionally moving
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book. While the contributors have not presented a persuasive argument
that their view of human nature is superior to and should replace that of
the dualist, they have certainly succeeded in putting together an informative collection of essays about the different ways in which contemporary
science is helping to give us a picture of what goes on in our brains when
different kinds of events occur in our mental lives.
From Cells to Souls-and Beyond presents a physicalist view of the human person in light of developments in contemporary science. In his A
Materialist Metaphysics of the Human Person, Hud Hudson presents, as the
title suggests, a materialistic metaphysical view of the human person.
Hudson presupposes that human persons are material objects and develops a materialist account of those persons that "requires some astounding
revisions in our commonly accepted metaphysics of the human person"
(2). To motivate his revisionist materialism, Hudson has the reader consider the following puzzle about a man named "Legion":
Legion, who is sitting in a chair at time T, is composed of material
simples (the Primary Set). A second set of material simples (the Secondary Set) exists at T and contains all the material simples in the Primary Set except an outermost simple (called "Righty") on Legion's
right hand and one additional material simple (called "Lefty") which
is located in the vicinity of Legion's left hand. Given the assumption
(i) that the property of being a person supervenes on the fusion of
the material simples in a set (a fusion of a set is an object that is composed of the set's members) and facts concerning the environment,
histories, types, arrangements and intrinsic properties of those material simples (what Hudson calls "Person-Composing Conditions"
(13)), and the additional assumption (ii) that the supervenience of
the property of being a person is insensitive to an insignificant difference such as that involving the absence of Righty and the presence of
Lefty while all the other material simples remain the same, then "we
have every reason to believe that if the fusion at T of the members of
[the Primary Set] is a person at T, then the fusion at T of the members
of [the Secondary Set] is a person at T, as well." (p. 14)
What Hudson calls "The Problem of the Many" is how to avoid the conclusion that there are many persons in the chair when we naturally believe
that only Legion is present.
Hudson discusses nine alleged solutions to The Problem of the Many,
and after dismissing all of them he considers what he calls the "3DPartist"
(three-dimensional partist) solution. According to 3DPartism, it is a mistake
to think that a material object has its constitutive (proper) parts intrinsically
or nonrelationally. Instead, a material object 0 has a part p at (in virtue of its
relation to) a spatial region r at a time t (p. 46). Hence, the shape of 0 (which
is a function of the arrangement of its parts) is not an intrinsic feature of it
but also is had relative to r at t (p. 49). 3DPartism implies not only that a
material object can be wholly present at more than one time (which is the
standard Three-Dimensionalist understanding of material objects), but also
that a material object can exactly occupy and, thereby, be wholly present,
at more than one region of space at a time (p. 49). Armed with his partism,
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the 3DPartist solves the Problem of the Many in the following way: there
is (as one ordinarily believes) only one person, Legion, who is sitting in the
chair at T. Legion, however, is identical with both the ·fusion of the material simples in the Primary Set (Hudson names this fusion "Tweedledee"),
which occupies one spatial region, and the fusion of the material simples
in the Secondary Set (Hudson names this fusion "Tweedledum"), which
occupies a different spatial region (though the regions completely overlap
except for the space occupied by Righty (which is a part of Tweedledee
but not Tweedledum) and the space occupied by Lefty (which is a part of
Tweedledum but not Tweedledee). Given classical identity, Tweedledee is
identical with Tweedledum.
Hudson openly admits that the idea that a material object has its parts
and, thereby, its shape relative to a spatial region (one might think of the
object inheriting or deriving its parts and shape from a spatial region)
is counterintuitive (p. 146). Though this is counterintuitive, Hudson believes it is a different implication of 3DPartism that undermines its truth.
To draw out this additional implication, Hudson has the reader consider
the puzzle case of Tibbles the cat (p. 54). At time TI, Tibbles has a tail.
The proper part of Tibbles excepting her tail is called "Tib". Tibbles and
Tib are not identical because Tibbles exactly occupies a larger region of
space than Tib, "and nothing [in this case, Tib] exactly occupies a larger
region of space than itself" (p. 54). Now, suppose Tibbles loses her tail.
Tibbles still exists as does Tib, but at post-accident times Tibbles and Tib
seem to exactly occupy the same region of space. Given that two material
objects cannot both exactly occupy the same region of space, Tibbles and
Tib are identical. Thus, Tibbles and Tib both are and are not identical. The
3DPartist seemingly has a way of solving this problem. Because the very
same object can simultaneously exactly occupy different regions of space,
Tib could exactly occupy the same (larger region of) space occupied by
Tibbles at a time prior to the accident. The trouble now, however, is that if,
at a pre-accident time TI, Tibbles and Tib are, as the 3DPartist maintains,
identical, then because Tibbles has Tib as a proper part of herself, Tib has
herself as a proper part. This, however, is impossible, given the mereological principle that no object has itself as a proper part (57).
To where should the materialist tum? Hudson believes that he should
tum to Four-Dimensionalism, which rejects the Three-Dimensionalist
thesis that a material object is wholly present at each of the plurality of
times at which it exists. According to the Four-Dimensionalist, an object
is not wholly present at each of the plurality of times at which it exists
but is spread out in time just as it is in space. Just as a material object has
spatial parts, so also it has temporal parts. "The principle idea is that necessarily, for each way of exhaustively dividing the lifetime of any object,
x, into two parts, there is a corresponding way of dividing x itself into
two parts, each of which is present throughout, but not outside of, the
corresponding part of x's lifetime" (pp. 58-59). As applied to the case of
Tibbles and Tib (pp. 68-69), Four-Dimensionalism implies the following:
The post-accident temporal parts of Tibbles and Tib exactly occupy the
same region of spacetime and are identical. Prior to the loss of her tail,
however, Tibbles and Tib exactly occupy distinct regions of spacetime,
though the second region is a proper sub-region of the first. Thus, while
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one and the same spacetime part is shared by both Tibbles and Tib, they
are distinct spacetime worms.
The case of Tibbles and Tib, however, is not the only problem that must
be resolved. There is also The Problem of the Many. To solve it, Hudson believes that Four-Dimensionalism should be supplemented with the partist
insights from 3DPartism to yield 4DPartism (p. 68). Legion, therefore, is a
four-dimensional spacetime worm who simultaneously exactly occupies
and is wholly present at distinct regions of spacetime. With the inclusion
of partism, however, the 4DPartist, like his 3DPartist counterpart, must
explain why Tibbles and Tib are not identical. The reason is much the
same as that given by the 3DPartist: because the spacetime region exactly
occupied by Tib is a proper subregion of that occupied by Tibbles, and
no object can have itself as a proper part at a region of spacetime, Tibbles
and Tib are not identical but are distinct spacetime worms which share a
spacetime part of post-accident regions (pp. 68-69).
What is one to make of all of this? Hudson calls one of the possible
responses to 3DPartism the "This view is nuts" objection (p. 53). "Could
be," says Hudson, though "[ilt would be good to say exactly why" (p.
53). Fair enough, though I am sure that Hudson will not find the explanation that I provide the least bit convincing. This is because he says the
Partist View "provides the best overall fit with [his] pre-philosophical intuitions" (p. 146). Given that my pre-philosophical intuitions are at odds
with Hudson's, and metaphysics, like philosophy in general, starts with
fundamental intuitions (one wonders whether the contributors to From
Cells to Souls-and Beyond would opt for dualism if they believed their
physicalist view required the truth of 4DPartism), I believe that I cannot
persuade Hudson that his view is wrong. Nevertheless, because it is possible (indeed, likely) that a reader will share more basic intuitions with me
than with Hudson, I will briefly explain why I think his view is nuts. Two
reasons are most important.
First, and most basically, and assuming for the sake of discussion that I
am a material object, the idea that I am four-dimensional spacetime worm
who is not wholly present at each moment that I exist conflicts with my
first-person awareness of myself as wholly present at the moment that I
am typing this sentence. The belief that I am wholly present at the present moment, which is grounded in this awareness of myself, is basic, and
because I cannot envision ever having an awareness of something that
undermines it (or the more general belief that I am wholly present at any
moment that I exist), I cannot envision ever giving it up.
Second, the idea that a material object can simultaneously exactly occupy and be wholly present at distinct regions of space is counterintuitive
because seemingly incoherent. While it makes sense to think that material
objects have proper parts that are present in different spatial regions at the
same time, material objects themselves cannot be in different spatial regions
at the same time. Given that a material object is wholly present in a region of
space only if all of its constituent proper parts are present in that region, the
claim that a material object which has all of its proper parts in one spatial
region that it exactly occupies can simultaneously exactly occupy a different spatial region seems incoherent. The Partist will remind me that I am
begging the question against him by assuming that a material object has its
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proper parts independent of its relationship to a spatial region. It doesn't. A
material object only has its proper parts relative to a region of space. What
this entails is that all of its proper parts are located in spatial region R1 in
virtue of being related to R1 and all of its proper parts are located in region
R2 in virtue of being related to R2. Perhaps it is because Partism seems so
absolutely incredible that Hudson suggests that there will have to be some
requirement of Significant overlap between the two spatial regions [R1 and
R2] in question," (p. 50) for otherwise the one and the same material object
could be simultaneously wholly present in Fenway Park and Wrigley Field.
Such a requirement, however, seems thoroughly ad hoc in nature and an
implicit recognition that the Partist claim that material objects have their
proper parts in virtue of their relationships to spatial regions is nuts. (Incidentally, it is interesting to note that the binding problem mentioned earlier
seems to be much less of a problem if a version of Partism that does not
include the requirement of significant overlap of spatial regions is true.)
The requirement in question, however, does not really explain away the
incredible nature of Partism. To see why, consider Legion who, because he
is supposedly identical with Tweedledum and Tweedledee, has the requisite significant overlap of spatial regions and, thereby, a significant overlap
in proper parts relative to that overlap. Because of Legion's identity with
Tweedledee and Tweedledum, however, it also is the case that he simultaneously has Righty relative to a spatial region R1 and Lefty relative to a
different spatial region R2. It follows, then, that Legion simultaneously has
one shape in relation to R1 and a barely discernible though nevertheless
genuinely different shape in relation to R2. If, instead of one Righty and
one Lefty, there were several billion of each arranged in the right ways,
Legion would end up simultaneously having an oval shape relative to R1
and an oblong shape relative to R2. Is that credible?
Finally, one might wonder about the metaphysical status of spatial regions themselves. Are they comprised of atomic spatial points? Do they
have their shapes intrinsically? If so, why do they have these metaphysical advantages over material objects? If they do not have such metaphysical advantages, is their ontological status also relational in nature? If so,
in relation to what? Material objects? A problem of circularity now rears
its head.
Though Partism seems nuts to me for the reasons just given, there is a
view in the ballpark that is similar to 3DPartism and, I think, much more
plausible. The price of admission, however, requires abandoning materialism and endorsing dualism. In other words, while a person has a material
body, he is not identical with it. The view I have in mind is non-Cartesian
and more medieval in nature. It was even endorsed by Kant and is the
idea that a person is a metaphysically simple soul who is wholly present
at each point in space that is occupied by his three-dimensional physical body (that has its parts intrinsically). Like 3DPartism, then, this form
of dualism maintains that a person can simultaneously occupy distinct
regions of space. Unlike 3DPartism, however, this form of dualism holds
that a soul has no substantive proper parts. Hence, it avoids the nutty
claims that go with 3DPartism.
Hudson considers dualism as a possible solution to The Problem of the
Many (pp. 19-21). He thinks dualism is not only nutty but also claims that
U
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it does not solve The Problem of the Many. It fails to solve The Problem
because it asserts that a soul is (causally) related to a human body. Which
human body, however? Tweedledee or Tweedledum? At this point, I think
it is fair to point out that The Problem of the Many is a problem given
a limited, naturalist ontology. If from the outset a metaphysician limits
himself to sets of material simples, fusions of them, and relational PersonComposing Conditions, then The Problem of the Many can lead to some
pretty nutty positions. Might not such a limitation and the fact that it leads
to a development of a view like 4DPartism constitute a reductio argument
against the materialist view of the human person? If one were to allow
for the existence of a soul, form, or some other unifying principle for organisms, then The Problem of the Many simply would not be a problem.
Legion's body would be identical with Tweedledee and not Tweedledum
because Righty, and not Lefty, would be under the influence of the relevant
unifying principle. Hudson's refusal to acknowledge the existence of such
a unifying principle is itself puzzling given his willingness to countenance
the existence of God. After all, God typically unifies various aspects of the
universe. Thus, because God creates and sustains the universe in being,
He guides its history and that of the human persons who dwell on the
face of the earth. Moreover, because God is just, He guarantees that each
person receives his proper reward and punishment. If one allows such a
being into one's ontology, is it all that implausible to think that it or something else could be the unifying principle for a human body?
In closing, I want to correct what might be a somewhat negative impression of Hudson's book and make clear that A Materialist Metaphysics of
the Human Person is an absolutely wonderful work. The mark of a truly fantastic book is not whether one agrees with it. It is whether one learns from
it and either now understands things that one never understood before or
understands them in a wholly clearer light. This book has that mark, and
I would be nuts if I did not recommend it enthusiastically. Though you
might not be nuts for not reading it, you will certainly be intellectually
worse off.l
NOTE
1. I want to thank J. P. Moreland and Dean Zimmerman for reading parts
of this review.
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